 Strategic Rivalry With Spillovers Within Segmented Versus Integrated MarketsGeert Steurs Economics of Innovation and New Technology, 1997, vol. 4, issue 4, 321-337 Abstract: We consider a two-stage game with firms investing in R&D in the first stage while competing [a] la Cournot in the second stage. The firms are located in two countries, which are either segmented or integrated. R&D spillovers occur between firms located in the same country as well as between firms located in different countries. We first examine the consequences of market integration on the impact of national and international R&D spillovers on innovative efforts, effective R&D, profits and total welfare. Comparing the resulting equilibrium levels, we subsequently conclude that market integration always leads to higher R&D investments and output if international R&D spillovers are limited, while the welfare consequences are ambiguous. Finally, we also analyze the welfare maximization problem of a 'constrained social planner who can only decide on the level of R&D spillovers. Keywords: R&D spillovers; Market Integration; Patent Policy JEL Codes: f15; 031; 034 (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:4:y:1997:i:4:p:321-337 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/10438599700000004 Access Statistics for this article Economics of Innovation and New Technology is currently edited by Professor Cristiano Antonelli More articles in Economics of Innovation and New Technology from Taylor & Francis Journals |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.