 Corporate non-participation in the ASB standard-setting processGeorge Georgiou European Accounting Review, 2002, vol. 11, issue 4, 699-722 Abstract: The standard-setting process of the UK's Accounting Standards Board (ASB) can be examined from different theoretical frameworks. One considers it a political process where interested parties choose to lobby on the basis of lobbying costs and benefits accrued from successful lobbying. The examination of the motives of various parties to lobby or not is considered important for understanding the process. Another framework assumes a non-pluralistic process, dominated by a few powerful groups to the detriment of the interests of other groups which are effectively excluded from the process. Drawing from the first framework, this study examines the factors which influenced the choice of a sample of UK listed companies not to make a submission on the ASB's discussion paper proposals on deferred tax. A perception that their participation would not make a difference to the outcome of the process and reliance on their external auditors to represent their position were found to be the most important factors for not making a submission. In contrast, no support was found for the suggestion that agreement with the proposals is more likely to prompt a non-response than disagreement with the proposals. Date: 2002 Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:euract:v:11:y:2002:i:4:p:699-722 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from DOI: 10.1080/0963818022000001028 Access Statistics for this article European Accounting Review is currently edited by Laurence van Lent More articles in European Accounting Review from Taylor & Francis Journals |
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