Information management with specific investments and cost-based transfer prices

Steffen Hinss, Alexis Kunz and Thomas Pfeiffer

European Accounting Review, 2005, vol. 14, issue 4, 815-838

Abstract: We analyse information flows in a profit-centre organisation with internal trade between two risk-neutral divisions. Prior to production, the divisions make unverifiable investments in intrafirm synergies. After investments are made, the selling division announces a cost-based transfer price which includes a mark-up on variable costs. The buying division then decides what quantity to purchase at that unit cost. From the head office's perspective, the key issues are to influence both, divisional investments and the seller's manipulation of the mark-up. To do so, the head office can fund a pre-decision information system before divisional investments are made. The system produces forward-looking information that can be used to improve the divisions' investment decisions, but which cannot be used in evaluating their performance. Our analytical framework allows us to identify cost and revenue structures for which pre-decision information either supports or destroys intrafirm synergies by motivating or discouraging divisional investments, thereby resulting in an increase in, decrease in or in no impact whatsoever on, firm profit. Among our most interesting findings is the counterintuitive result that pre-decision information can undermine the incentives of risk-neutral agents to invest specifically. Our results add to earlier agency models that found different, albeit equally dysfunctional effects of pre-decision information. Contrary to these studies, our findings are not driven by either risk aversion or rent extraction.

Date: 2005
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DOI: 10.1080/09638180500104659

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