Organizational Control and Work Effort -- Another Look at the Interplay of Rewards and Motivation
Jennifer Kunz and
Stefan Linder
European Accounting Review, 2012, vol. 21, issue 3, 591-621
Abstract:
Providing rewards is a central element of organizational control systems. However, the literature is hardly helpful from a practitioner's perspective: it typically focuses on monetary rewards at the expense of non-monetary, affiliative rewards, and yet researchers disagree over the usefulness of the prior ones. Some scholars claim that monetary rewards merely replace task-related (‘intrinsic’) motivation by reward-induced external pressure (‘extrinsic’ motivation). Empirical findings are mixed, partially given the different conceptualizations of intrinsic motivation. We shed more light on the impact of both monetary and non-monetary, affiliative rewards on the willingness to exert work effort and a potential detrimental interaction with different forms of intrinsic motivation. Our experimental results suggest that monetary and affiliative rewards have different effects: affiliative rewards clearly have beneficial effects, whereas the picture for monetary rewards is more nuanced than typically assumed in literature.
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:euract:v:21:y:2012:i:3:p:591-621
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DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2012.684498
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