An Experimental Study of Endogenous Discretionary Controls on Employee Effort

Jeremy D. Douthit, Jing Liu, Steven T. Schwartz and Richard A. Young

European Accounting Review, 2024, vol. 33, issue 1, 77-103

Abstract: Discretionary controls are controls that can be applied at the ex post discretion of the superior rather than being supported by pre-committed enforceable contracts. This study examines employees’ effort levels when a discretionary control is endogenously present (chosen by the superior) relative to when it is exogenously present (assigned by the experimenters). Results from our gift-exchange experiment regarding superiors’ choice of a discretionary control run counter to prior research on superiors’ choice to use pre-committed controls in two important ways. First, we find employee effort is unaffected by the superior’s choice of a discretionary control relative to when it is exogenous. That is, the intentional choice of a discretionary control does not seem to be resented by the employee. Second, we find employee effort is lower when superiors choose not to have a discretionary control present relative to when it is exogenously unavailable. That is, we not only find no reward to forgoing a discretionary control, but rather a cost to not choosing a discretionary control. In sum, our results support the prevalence of discretionary controls in practice.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2022.2063151

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