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Accounting Accruals, Audit Quality, and Audit Pricing

Sebastian Kronenberger

European Accounting Review, 2025, vol. 34, issue 2, 671-693

Abstract: This study examines the impact of the interaction between firms' accounting choices and auditors' audit effort choices on audit pricing. In a multi-period model, I focus on a central feature of accounting: reversing accruals. I find that initial low-balling, defined as lower audit fees than audit costs, arises independently from the direction of accruals, but increases with more conservatism in the first engagement period. The reason is that a conservative accruals strategy implies understated earnings today and overstated earnings in the future, which creates a higher investor demand for auditing services in future periods. The incumbent auditor can satisfy this future demand better than any competitor, because the first-period learning cost is sunk. Thus, conservatism enhances the competitive advantage of the incumbent and increases the future quasi-rent, which is used for a higher initial low-balling discount. I further show implications of the auditor-firm interaction for fee-cutting, a common proxy for low-balling, and the frequency of modified audit opinions, a common proxy for audit quality. Thus, my model provides a theoretical foundation for the connection between high low-balling discounts, accounting accruals, and audit quality.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2023.2270002

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