Accounting information, salesforce compensation and acquisition of new customers

Maximilian Jung and Christian Riegler

European Accounting Review, 1999, vol. 8, issue 3, 421-441

Abstract: The need for the management accounting system (MAS) to support marketing decisions has been identified in literature and practice. Accordingly, several improvements have been suggested with the main intention of providing more detailed information on marketing segments. Yet, even with respect to these improved systems it has to be acknowledged that the quality of the information provided will not be identical for all marketing segments: it can be assumed that it will be more precise for existing segments, which are already served by the firm, than for new ones, with which the firm has comparatively little experience. Further, it has to be considered that the MAS will seldom be the only source of useful information, as the example of the good salesforce having gained a 'deep understanding' of the market while doing his job shows. A problem arises if the acquisition of this additional information is (personally) costly and unobservable and therefore has to be motivated by incentive compensation schemes. This paper emphasizes that standard compensation contracts, as recommended by literature and practice, may fail to induce goal-congruent behaviour. It is shown that ranking commission rates according to the profitabilities reported by the MAS may be dysfunctional and that a non-intuitive rank order may be necessary to motivate the salesforce to become better informed and to use this knowledge appropriately.

Date: 1999
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DOI: 10.1080/096381899335862

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