Buybacks of domestic debt in public debt management

Silvia Marchesi

The European Journal of Finance, 2006, vol. 12, issue 5, 379-400

Abstract: This paper shows how public debt repurchases can be used to reduce the costs of debt service under the hypothesis that the government could be of two types and that there is asymmetric information between the government and the private sector. For example, at the beginning of a fiscal stabilization a government typically does not enjoy full credibility among investors and high interest rates on longterm bonds may reflect credibility problem rather than term premia. In a two-period framework, this paper suggests that buybacks could be used to reduce the risk premia since they can signal government commitment to a previously-announced policy.

Keywords: Asymmetric information; signalling; public debt management; buybacks (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Working Paper: Buybacks of domestic debt in public debt management (2000)
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DOI: 10.1080/13518470500459931

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