How value-glamour investors use financial information: UK evidence of investors' confirmation bias

Chau Duong, Gioia Pescetto and Daniel Santamaria

The European Journal of Finance, 2014, vol. 20, issue 6, 524-549

Abstract: This paper investigates how investors in value and glamour stocks use financial information. The empirical evidence presented is in line with a model of investors' asymmetric reaction to good and bad news due to confirmation bias. Pessimistic value investors typically under-react to good financial information, while they process bad information rationally or over-confidently. On the contrary, glamour investors are often too optimistic to timely update prices following bad financial information, while they are likely to fairly price or even over-react when receiving good information.

Date: 2014
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1351847X.2012.722117 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:20:y:2014:i:6:p:524-549

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/REJF20

DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2012.722117

Access Statistics for this article

The European Journal of Finance is currently edited by Chris Adcock

More articles in The European Journal of Finance from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().