Information-based stock trading and managerial incentives: evidence from China's stock market

Michael Firth, Man Jin and Yuanyuan Zhang

The European Journal of Finance, 2014, vol. 20, issue 7-9, 637-656

Abstract: This paper uses stock price informativeness, or information-based stock trading, to help explain the pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in China's listed firms. We argue that higher stock price informativeness, which we measure by the probability of informed trading, helps and encourages shareholders to incentivize the top management team based on stock market performance. The regression results support our argument and show that a higher level of stock price informativeness is associated with higher CEO PPSs. Moreover, the impact of stock price informativeness on CEO incentives is stronger for privately controlled listed firms than it is for state-controlled listed firms. The results also hold when information asymmetry is approximated by the accuracy and dispersion of the earnings forecasts made by financial analysts.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2012.672441

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