A separate monitoring organ and disclosure of firm-specific information
Zhenyu Wu,
Yuanshun Li,
Shujun Ding and
Chunxin Jia
The European Journal of Finance, 2016, vol. 22, issue 4-6, 371-392
Abstract:
As the economy is recovering from the recent financial crisis, we explore the appropriateness of a corporate monitoring organ, which is a component separate from the board of directors, to enhance firm-specific information disclosure. Findings of this study, rooted in the evidence from China's stock markets, confirm that having a separate and effective monitoring organ results in a higher level of idiosyncratic risk, as long as the legal environment is sufficiently strong and the functionality of this separate monitoring organ is clearly defined. Effects of regulatory changes and ownership characteristics are addressed to help better understand the corporate governance--idiosyncratic risk relationship. Moreover, this study sheds light on timely global issues about information transparency and supervision, the lack of which becomes one of the major causes of the ongoing financial crisis, and presents an important challenge before corporate governance.
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:22:y:2016:i:4-6:p:371-392
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DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2012.762410
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