Executive compensation and the split share structure reform in China

Wenxuan Hou, Edward Lee, Konstantinos Stathopoulos and Zhenxu Tong

The European Journal of Finance, 2016, vol. 22, issue 4-6, 506-528

Abstract: The split share structure reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more strongly related to share price movements. We predict that this reform will create remuneration arrangements that strengthen the relationship between Chinese firms’ executive pay and stock market performance. We confirm this prediction by showing that there is such an effect among state-controlled firms, and especially those where the dominant shareholders have a greater incentive to improve share return performance. Our results indicate that this reform strengthens the accountability of executives to external monitoring by the stock market, and therefore benefits minority shareholders in China.

Date: 2016
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2013.802250

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