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A theory of operational cash holding, endogenous financial constraints, and credit rationing

Gerhard Kling

The European Journal of Finance, 2018, vol. 24, issue 1, 59-75

Abstract: This paper develops a theory of operational cash holding. Liquidity shocks due to delayed payments must be financed using cash or short-term debt. Debt holders provide an irrevocable credit line given a firm's expected insolvency risk, and equity holders select optimum cash holding. The model demonstrates the trade-off between cash holding and investing in fixed assets. Introducing uncertain cash flows leads to precautionary cash holding if debt holders impose financial constraints. Precautionary cash holding, in turn, reduces insolvency risk enhancing access to short-term finance. The theory shows that credit rationing can occur in the absence of market frictions. Using U.S. data from 1998 to 2012, empirical findings suggest that the decline in credit lines has contributed to the increase in cash holding in line with theoretical predictions.

Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2016.1225590

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