Vertical merger, R&D collaboration and innovation
Kaiguo Zhou,
Runyu Yan and
Yanchu Liu
The European Journal of Finance, 2019, vol. 25, issue 14, 1289-1308
Abstract:
This paper studies the effects of vertical merger and R&D collaboration activities on firms' innovation decisions and stock returns based on a continuous-time real option model under market and technological uncertainties. Our analysis confirms vertical merger's benefit in amplifying the potential gain from innovation through eliminating inefficiencies. We show that vertical merger boosts innovation incentives in two ways: it reduces the optimal innovation threshold when firms suspend the project and increases R&D investment when firms launch the project. If vertical merger is not possible, R&D collaboration can improve firms' innovation levels as an alternative decision, but inefficiencies still exist which implies less pronounced stimulation effects. Both vertical merger and R&D collaboration can reduce firms' risk when conducting innovation project and weaken the positive R&D-returns relation and financial constraints-returns relation, while these effects of vertical merger are stronger than those of R&D collaboration.
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:25:y:2019:i:14:p:1289-1308
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DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2019.1589551
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