Labor unions and loan contracts
Yi Zhang,
Guangzi Li and
Yili Lian
The European Journal of Finance, 2020, vol. 26, issue 6, 461-479
Abstract:
This paper investigates the relation between labor unions and loan contracting. We find that firms in more unionized industries tend to have lower loan spreads, longer maturity, a lower likelihood of security requirement, fewer and less strict loan covenants, and fewer performance- based covenants. Additionally, using firm-level union election data, we do not find lower loan spreads or longer maturity in unionized firms, but we show that bank loans to unionized firms are less likely to require security, have fewer and less strict loan covenants, and fewer performance-based covenants. While the results on loan spreads are mixed, we find consistent evidence that unionization has significant effect on loan covenants with industry and firm level unionization data as well as the instrument variable analysis. Labor unions’ risk preference is similar to that of creditors. Therefore, it helps align the interests between banks and labor unions, thus reducing the cost of bank loans in terms of loan covenants.
Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1351847X.2019.1686044 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:26:y:2020:i:6:p:461-479
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/REJF20
DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2019.1686044
Access Statistics for this article
The European Journal of Finance is currently edited by Chris Adcock
More articles in The European Journal of Finance from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().