The consensus equilibria of mining gap games related to the stability of Blockchain Ecosystems

Lan Di, George X. Yuan and Tu Zeng

The European Journal of Finance, 2021, vol. 27, issue 4-5, 419-440

Abstract: The equity and currency tokens are typically two kinds of initial coin offerings (ICOs) like Bitcoin or Ethereum based on the platform of Blockchains to provide a particular product or service, it is very important to study the mechanism of Blockchain Ecosystems. The goal of this paper is to explain the stable in the sense for the existence of consensus equilibria for mining gap games by using one new concept called ‘consensus games (CG)’ under the framework of Blockchain Ecosystems which mainly mean the economic activities by taking into the account of three types of different factors which are expenses, reward mechanism and mining power for the work on blockschain by applying consensuses including the ‘Proof of Work’ due to Nakamoto in 2008 as a special case.

Date: 2021
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1351847X.2020.1776352 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:27:y:2021:i:4-5:p:419-440

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/REJF20

DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2020.1776352

Access Statistics for this article

The European Journal of Finance is currently edited by Chris Adcock

More articles in The European Journal of Finance from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().