Board Political Superiority and firm performance variability

Qingfeng Wang and Xingyi Zhang

The European Journal of Finance, 2023, vol. 29, issue 8, 919-948

Abstract: This study provides empirical evidence that firms with a higher proportion of board directors who are politically more powerful than their CEOs can significantly reduce stock performance variability, but not on accounting performance variability. Our findings show that among independent (female, non-coopted) directors, only those who are politically more powerful than CEOs are effective in their monitoring role. In our additional tests, we show that our findings are not driven by an endogeneity bias. We find some mechanisms through which politically superior boards can mitigate stock performance variability.

Date: 2023
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/1351847X.2022.2087533 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:eurjfi:v:29:y:2023:i:8:p:919-948

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/REJF20

DOI: 10.1080/1351847X.2022.2087533

Access Statistics for this article

The European Journal of Finance is currently edited by Chris Adcock

More articles in The European Journal of Finance from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().