Restacking the deck: Family policy and women's fall-back position in Germany before and after unification

Lynn Duggan

Feminist Economics, 1995, vol. 1, issue 1, 175-194

Abstract: This paper examines some of the effects of East and West German family policy on women's economic position by analyzing intrahousehold bargaining power, defined here as based on co-resident partners' relative fall-back positions, which in turn depend on the individuals' access to income in the event that the partnership ends. East German policy sought to integrate women into the labor force through programs such as free public child care and liberal maternity leave. West Germany based its family policy on the assumption of a stark gender division of labor, with one lifetime breadwinner per family and a second parent who temporarily leaves the labor force to raise children. On the basis of her findings and analysis, the author argues that while East German institutions increased women's bargaining power, gender-specific policies interfered with women's ability to use this power to bring about changes in the household division of labor. West German family policy did not assign gender roles, but it offered women less bargaining power with which to negotiate. The author maintains that society's refusal to address women's greater child-rearing costs is not based on an assessment of such costs and the costs of redistributive government programs, but on the assumption that women should absorb the risks and burdens of reproduction.

Keywords: Family policy; bargaining power; Germany; child-rearing; costs; housework; household work; socialism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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DOI: 10.1080/714042220

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