Epistemology and the tasks of feminist economics

Janet Seiz

Feminist Economics, 1995, vol. 1, issue 3, 110-118

Abstract: This paper examines the implications of current epistemological debates for the work of feminist economists. Feminist economists must acknowledge (in accordance with recent developments in the study of science) that (a) inquirers can never be certain whether claims about the world are true; (b) scientific inquiry is permeated with “internal” and “external” values; and (c) beliefs are affected by inquirers' social locations. But feminists should not, it argues, embrace the “relativist” stance of some postmodern thinkers, or reject the ideal of “truth,” or argue that beliefs are strictly determined by inquirers' identities and interests. It seeks to outline an epistemological “middle ground” for feminist economics, between the extremes of exaggerated claims of certainty and a disempowering relativism.

Keywords: Feminist economics; economic methodology; epistemology (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1995
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DOI: 10.1080/714042252

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