Joint Land Titling and Household Bargaining in Madagascar

Marit Widman and Robert Hart

Feminist Economics, 2019, vol. 25, issue 4, 211-239

Abstract: This paper investigates analytically and through numerical simulations how the intrahousehold bargaining positions of a couple are affected by the opportunity to title agricultural land, and how the couple’s choice between an individual male title and a joint title is determined. The results suggest that when land registration is offered to couples as a discrete choice between individual or joint titles, there is a risk that women with weak initial bargaining positions will be further weakened following the reform. A joint title will only be chosen if the spouses start off with relatively equal bargaining positions; otherwise a male title will be chosen. An application of the model to the situation of Madagascar, using household survey data, supports the predictions of the model.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13545701.2019.1665195 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:femeco:v:25:y:2019:i:4:p:211-239

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/RFEC20

DOI: 10.1080/13545701.2019.1665195

Access Statistics for this article

Feminist Economics is currently edited by Diana Strassmann

More articles in Feminist Economics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().