Gender Quotas as (Non-)Binding Constraints: the Case of Semi-Open List Formation in Flemish Municipalities

Bruno Heyndels and Colin R. Kuehnhanss

Feminist Economics, 2020, vol. 26, issue 2, 160-186

Abstract: In semi-open list systems, parties present pre-selected pools of candidates to the electorate. Candidates’ assigned ranks on the lists heavily influence their election odds and may reflect party leaders’ preferences, notably a possible gender bias. To strengthen women's representation, parties’ choices are increasingly subject to legal quotas. These quotas are expected to be less binding for left-wing parties, which tend to be more women-friendly. Analyzing 854 party lists presented to Flemish voters in the 2012 local elections, this study finds that right-wing party leadership discriminate in favor of women by offering them higher positions on the party lists. For leftist parties, the study finds discrimination in favor of men. Importantly, parties offering higher positions to women tend to do so in parts of the party list certain to lead to either election (left-wing parties) or non-election (right-wing parties). For positions with critical election-odds, no gender bias is identified.HIGHLIGHTS • Women's representation is a major concern in today's politics.• Gender quotas in elections are meant to ensure women's presence on ballots.• In the 2012 Flemish elections, women candidates were on average positioned higher on party ballots than they would be if positioning were based on anticipated electoral success.• Left-wing parties advantage women in positions with high chances of election. Right-wing parties advance women only in positions with low chances of success.• For positions with critical election odds, rankings across all parties are based on expected electoral success in terms of preferential votes, irrespective of candidate gender.• Assigned ballot positions may reflect underlying gender preferences or power balance within the party leadership. Gender biases may be neutralized more effectively by placement mandates than by general quota rules.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/13545701.2019.1685675

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