What is a criminal organization and why does the law care?

Phil Curry and Steeve Mongrain

Global Crime, 2009, vol. 10, issue 1-2, 6-23

Abstract: The Criminal Codes in both Canada and the United States allow for criminals to be penalized to a greater degree if they are a member of an organization. We draw on the economic theory of punishment, which states that expected penalty should be proportional to the social harm caused, to put a different perspective on such regulations. According to the economic theory, additional punishments are desirable if either: (1) the social harm from a criminal act is greater for a member of an organization than for an independent criminal; or (2) the probability of conviction is lower. We examine the extent to which both of these possibilities are true and use the findings to revisit the definition of a criminal organization.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/17440570902782402

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