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What are the Local Political Costs of Centrally Determined Reforms of Local Government?

Ulrik Kjaer and Robert Klemmensen

Local Government Studies, 2015, vol. 41, issue 1, 100-118

Abstract: Taking advantage of a quasi-experimental setting and drawing upon analysis of electoral results and a survey of voters, this article explores the political costs of reform through the example of the 2009 local elections in Denmark. The article finds that the local parties of mayors were punished at the polls for implementing municipal amalgamations decided by the central government. However, the effect on the mayoral parties’ electoral result is more indirect than direct. Analyses of the electoral results demonstrates that the political parties holding the mayoralty in times of amalgamations tend to nominate very tenured mayors as candidates, thereby missing the positive first-term incumbency effect, which a new mayor could have acquired. And analyses of a survey of voters demonstrates higher levels of dissatisfaction with the municipal service in amalgamated municipalities, leading to a higher cost of ruling for mayoral parties which have led the implementation of an amalgamation.

Date: 2015
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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DOI: 10.1080/03003930.2014.887564

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