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Choosing Coalition Partners in Belgian Local Government

Ellen Olislagers and Kristof Steyvers

Local Government Studies, 2015, vol. 41, issue 2, 202-219

Abstract: Government formation is a crucial phase after elections. This article focusses on coalition formation in Belgian local government after the elections in 2006. Coalition theories have mainly been developed at the national level, but they are also applicable to the local level where there is no shortage of coalitions. This level offers the opportunity to not only test rather classic coalition theories such as minimum size theories or the coalitions’ incumbency status. In a federal state like Belgium we can compare the local coalitions with coalitions made at higher levels. The results show that the local political parties prefer to form minimal winning and minimum parties coalitions, but not the smallest coalition that is possible. Coalitions are also more likely to form when they represent the incumbent coalition. Finally, political parties prefer congruent coalitions with the federal and regional government.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/03003930.2014.884496

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