Political incentives and transaction costs of collaboration among US cities for economic development

Christopher V. Hawkins

Local Government Studies, 2017, vol. 43, issue 5, 752-775

Abstract: This study extends research on Institutional Collective Action by testing a transaction cost explanation for self-organising economic development agreements between US cities. We offer a unique contribution to this literature by identifying how these agreements between cities with similar political institutions mitigate the transaction costs of collaboration, and how characteristics of these agreements combine with political institutions to shape collective action. The results of an empirical analysis of data collected through a survey of local officials suggest the alignment of high-powered political incentives between cities mitigates the coordination and division problems of forming a joint venture. Agreements that enable elected officials to distribute the benefits of an agreement are also found to moderate this effect.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/03003930.2017.1337568

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