Sacrifice and Sorting in Clubs

Jean-Paul Carvalho

Forum for Social Economics, 2020, vol. 49, issue 4, 357-369

Abstract: In club models of religion, sacrifices demanded by religious groups promote efficient production of club goods by screening out free riders. An alternative, complementary view is that religious clubs provide a means of sorting, matching individuals with similar characteristics. Sorting differs from screening in that it operates on traits that do not directly affect club goods production. This article explores the role of sacrifice in sorting among religious clubs when individuals prefer to interact with their own type. Despite this own-type bias, the usual free-rider problem in club goods production can inhibit sorting among groups. Prohibitions and demands for stigmatizing behavior can solve this problem. Costly sacrifices are demanded, not by groups catering to the majority, but by those attracting rare/exotic types. The rarer the type, the more costly the sacrifice required to achieve sorting.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/07360932.2015.1125383

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