Political Parties and Grassroots Clientelist Strategies in Urban Turkey: One Neighbourhood at a Time

Ceren Ark-Yıldırım

South European Society and Politics, 2017, vol. 22, issue 4, 473-490

Abstract: Both principal Turkish political parties make extensive use of patron–client networks, but in very different ways. The CHP relies on competing local brokers and synchronous vote buying. The AKP is at the centre of a network of public and private funding turning social policy to clientelist ends. Socially anchored AKP activists link the party to voters, allowing it to target social assistance for political advantage and take credit for improvement in local conditions. The case presented in this paper provides a natural experiment suggesting that this distinction is an important explanation for the AKP’s electoral success in low-income urban areas.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2017.1406431

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