Institutional Suicide and Elite Coordination: The Spanish Transition Revisited

Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca and Luis Fernando Medina

South European Society and Politics, 2019, vol. 24, issue 4, 463-484

Abstract: In the literature on democratisation, the Spanish case has a paradigmatic status, especially for the negotiations between the regime and the opposition. While these negotiations did stabilise the new regime, the transition was driven by the regime’s elites. The key event was the approval of the Law for Political Reform in November 1976, when the legislature voted its own demise. The change was done according to the rules of the system. To explain this reform, we offer a formal model of coordination and a statistical analysis of an original dataset of the 531 legislators. The reform was possible because of elites’ belief coordination.

Date: 2019
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13608746.2019.1694282 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:fsesxx:v:24:y:2019:i:4:p:463-484

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/fses20

DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2019.1694282

Access Statistics for this article

South European Society and Politics is currently edited by Susannah Verney

More articles in South European Society and Politics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().