Reforming Greece’s Tax Administration during the Financial Crisis: The Paradox of Power Asymmetry

Dionyssis G. Dimitrakopoulos and Argyris G. Passas

South European Society and Politics, 2020, vol. 25, issue 1, 27-48

Abstract: This article examines the depoliticisation of Greece’s tax administration under the post-2010 bailout agreements in light of three alternative models of domestic change. It shows that one model (external incentives model that is based on power asymmetry) accounts for the direction of the reform but not how far the reform ended up going. There is little evidence in support of the second model (social learning) because of the absence of genuine programme ownership and evidence in support of the third model (lesson-drawing) is limited to the diagnosis of the problem. The final outcome was unintentionally shaped by key choices made by Greek governments in line with the literature on conditionality.

Date: 2020
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/13608746.2020.1762371 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:fsesxx:v:25:y:2020:i:1:p:27-48

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/fses20

DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2020.1762371

Access Statistics for this article

South European Society and Politics is currently edited by Susannah Verney

More articles in South European Society and Politics from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().