A case of top-down intergovernmentalism? The Spanish bilateral cooperation commissions

Marc Sanjaume-Calvet, Mireia Grau Creus, Pau Torres, Berta Barbet-Porta and Marc Jodar

South European Society and Politics, 2024, vol. 29, issue 3, 355-384

Abstract: This article analyses the dynamics of a specific intergovernmental-relations (IGR) mechanism that exists in Spain: the bilateral cooperation commissions (BCC). These commissions are intergovernmental negotiation forums designed to address discrepancies on legislation in a bilateral and pre-emptive way, before they escalate to the Constitutional Court (CC). Using official data, we construct a database of all negotiations between 2000 and 2021. Our results align with prior research on this subject and mirror broader trends within the Spanish territorial model and its IGR: the hierarchical nature of the IGR structure, and the relevance of inter- and intra-party competition in shaping it. These results also illustrate that the weaknesses of IGR in Spain and, by extension, of shared-rule, mirror the subordinated structure of self-rule throughout the Spanish system.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2025.2470555

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