Not just about the ruling: when does the opposition challenge a law in the Spanish Constitutional Court?

Andreu Rodilla Lázaro

South European Society and Politics, 2025, vol. 30, issue 2, 195-225

Abstract: Theory of anticipatory calculus posits that party decisions to challenge a law are based on expectations of a favourable court ruling; however, in cases such as Spain, laws are often brought to court when the chances of their being overturned seem low. This article draws on an original dataset covering all laws the Spanish parliament passed between 1996 and 2023. It shows that short term political incentives related to partisan competition play a more important role in the decision to challenge a law than an intention of overturning it. Media attention to the bill and expected competition in forthcoming elections provide a better explanation for patterns of judicialization. Interestingly, findings related to the electoral cycle contradict prevailing expectations in the literature.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2025.2475019

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