The Kashmir insurgency: As bad as it gets

Alexander Evans

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2000, vol. 11, issue 1, 69-81

Abstract: In January 2000, the Kashmir militancy is gaining ground and Indian forces are on the defensive. This is despite a decline in militancy from 1996 to mid‐1999. While India has managed to secure greater international support from the West, the failure of an elected state government in Kashmir to regain the confidence of Kashmiris has cost Delhi support. The militant revival is being driven by increasing professionalism, along with strong support from backers in Pakistan. Given there is now a 12‐year period of violence to analyse, new literature brings interesting insights.1

Date: 2000
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DOI: 10.1080/09592310008423261

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