The Palestine Police Force and the challenges of gathering counterterrorism intelligence, 1939–1947

Bruce Hoffman

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2013, vol. 24, issue 4, 609-647

Abstract: This article assesses the performance of the Palestine Police Force (PPF) in countering the Jewish underground organizations that challenged British rule over Palestine after World War II. It argues that four reasons account for the PPF's inability to contain the terrorist threat: the chronic manpower shortages that ultimately compromised its effectiveness and required the military's intervention; the progressive militarization of the PPF that undermined its ability to discharge traditional police functions; its desperate deployment of elite, special counterterrorist units; and its problematical collection and analysis of intelligence. The article concludes that these weaknesses inevitably led to a situation where the maintenance of law and order was impossible and British rule was rendered untenable.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2013.857936

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