Shafer revisited – the three great oughts of winning the hearts and minds: analysing the assumptions underpinning the British and Dutch COIN approach in Helmand and Uruzgan

Mirjam Grandia Mantas

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2013, vol. 24, issue 4, 731-750

Abstract: The comprehensive approach, also known as the integrated approach, is foundational to the strategies of the Western countries operating in south Afghanistan. It builds on the same premise as the hearts and minds (HAM) theory: by providing security and basic needs to the population, support is taken away from insurgents. The assumption that a (fragile) state will be able (with support of foreign troops and organisations) to provide basic services, security, and economic prosperity, which was questioned and critiqued by Michael Schafer over two decades ago, is still part of the contemporary concept and seems to remain uncontested. The objective of this article is to test Shafer's claims about the perseverance of what he coined ‘the deadly paradigms of counterinsurgency’ against the British and Dutch experiences in south Afghanistan starting in 2005.

Date: 2013
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2013.857934

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