Keep the change: Counterinsurgency, Iraq, and historical understanding

Celeste Ward Gventer

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2014, vol. 25, issue 1, 242-253

Abstract: This article explores the historical reasoning behind counterinsurgency thinking, particularly as applied to Iraq, using Douglas Porch's book, Counterinsurgency: Exposing the Myths of the New Way of War as a reference point. It argues that the classic historical analogies of counterinsurgency theory were inapt in dealing with the conflict in Iraq, and that the historical reasoning behind counterinsurgency more generally deserves greater scrutiny. Not only are the analogies of questionable applicability, but the evidence of causation in prior conflicts is ultimately unproveable. In the end, Counterinsurgency theory and the US Army's Field Manual 3-24 on Counterinsurgency were politically useful during the ‘Surge’, beginning in 2007, but remain intellectually and historically problematic.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2014.894268

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