The evolution of Hezbollah's strategy and military performance, 1982–2006

Iver Gabrielsen

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2014, vol. 25, issue 2, 257-283

Abstract: This article fills a gap in the research on Hezbollah by evaluating their military performance from their formation in 1982 and up till the 2006 Israel–Hezbollah war. This study tests the theses that Hezbollah had developed a very strong tactical proficiency in the late 1990s and that there are more similarities in their strategy and tactics during the 2006 war and the 1982–2000 insurgency in Southern Lebanon than previously assumed. Another central theme of this article is how Hezbollah has been constantly adapting and evolving for the duration of its existence.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2014.903636

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