Military intelligence and the war in Dhofar: An appraisal

Clive Jones

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2014, vol. 25, issue 3, 628-646

Abstract: This article examines the role military intelligence played in the Dhofar campaign between 1970 and 1976. Drawing on an array of sources, it examines not only the crucial role played by military intelligence in prosecuting a successful operational campaign against a Marxist inspired insurgency, but equally, the importance that intelligence played in consolidating the Al Bu Said dynasty when across Oman and Dhofar itself, the material benefits to be had from the discovery and production of oil had yet to be realised.

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2014.913743

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