Deterrence and overseas stability

John Stone

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2014, vol. 25, issue 3, 669-684

Abstract: The use of conventional armed forces in a deterrent role merits close consideration. Instability in weak or failing states can have global ramifications, while efforts to build stability take time. In principle, conventional deterrence can be used to buy the time required for such stabilization efforts. Attempts at deterrence will, however, need to overcome credibility problems stemming from the technical limitations associated with conventional armed forces, and with the likely requirement for multiple external actors to deter multiple intrastate audiences. While deterrence might work under certain circumstances, it will not play as central a role in strategy as it did during the Cold War.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09592318.2014.913756 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:fswixx:v:25:y:2014:i:3:p:669-684

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/fswi20

DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2014.913756

Access Statistics for this article

Small Wars and Insurgencies is currently edited by Paul Rich

More articles in Small Wars and Insurgencies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().