Delusions of survival: US deliberations on support for South Vietnam during the 1975 ‘Final Offensive’

Jeffrey H. Michaels

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2015, vol. 26, issue 6, 957-975

Abstract: When North Vietnam launched a military offensive in March 1975, there was little expectation that South Vietnam would collapse 55 days later. As the South’s forces quickly crumbled and the scale of the military disaster became increasingly apparent, the United States considered a number of options to provide emergency assistance to its ally. This article will examine the evolution of the diplomatic, economic, military, and covert options US policymakers developed to support the South during the Final Offensive. These policy options will be set against the backdrop of the ‘scripts’ US officials devised to justify emergency assistance, as well as their delusions about the South’s prospects for survival.

Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2015.1095838

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