The ‘first’ surge: the repulse of the Easter Invasion in South Vietnam, 1972 – implications for Iraq and Afghanistan

Timothy J. Lomperis

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2016, vol. 27, issue 1, 132-153

Abstract: In a military intervention, do surges work? I compare the failed ‘surge’ in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: the military dimensions and strategy of the surging forces, the military capabilities of the host forces, the political vitality and will of the host country, and the political commitment in the domestic politics of the intervener. I find that the last feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the American political commitment was lacking.

Date: 2016
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1123434

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