Brinkmanship, not COIN, in Pakistan’s post-9/11 Internal War

Samir Puri

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2017, vol. 28, issue 1, 218-232

Abstract: Politics is critical to making sense of Pakistani successes and failures in dealing with non-state armed groups. This includes domestic political currents; regional political currents; and the global impetus of the post-9/11 era. How these currents overlap renders to any reading of insurgency in Pakistan real complexity. This article engages with this complexity rather than shirking from it. Its hypothesis is that while the insurgency bordering Afghanistan has been an epicentre of Pakistani military efforts to fight the Taliban, this theatre is in of itself insufficiently inclusive to grasp the nature of Pakistan’s security challenges and its consequent responses.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2016.1263471

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