Command Coordination and Tactical Effectiveness in Counter-insurgency Operations: Lessons from the South Korean Campaign

Soul Park and Seung Joon Paik

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2018, vol. 29, issue 2, 291-315

Abstract: This article analyzes the causes of combat effectiveness of the South Korean security forces through the course of its various counter-insurgency (COIN) operations from 1948 to 1953. We argue that improvements in two interrelated aspects ultimately resulted in higher operational and tactical level performance: unified operational command structure and the subsequent improvements in tactical efficiency under the guidance of the US advisory mission. Through an in-depth case study on how a nascent army improved its capacity in combating homegrown insurgencies, we demonstrate how the actual conduct of operations itself remains just as significant in the assessment of overall COIN outcomes.

Date: 2018
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/09592318.2018.1433509 (text/html)
Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:taf:fswixx:v:29:y:2018:i:2:p:291-315

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.tandfonline.com/pricing/journal/fswi20

DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1433509

Access Statistics for this article

Small Wars and Insurgencies is currently edited by Paul Rich

More articles in Small Wars and Insurgencies from Taylor & Francis Journals
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Chris Longhurst ().