The Mexican War: frontier expansion and selective incursion

Craig A. Deare

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2019, vol. 30, issue 1, 14-30

Abstract: Mexico’s defeat in the war that (in the U.S.) takes the country’s name resulted as much from the strategic context created by unrealized nation-building that followed independence as it did from American tactical supremacy. Three centuries of Spanish empire did not translate into national military excellence due to the decades of revolutionary upheaval that followed the sudden decapitation occasioned by Napoleon’s ouster of the monarchy in Madrid. That the occupation which followed major combat provided salutary lessons learned in dealing with guerrillas rather than a Vietnam-like litany of quagmire eventuated from the conscious designs of military leadership steeped in the same Napoleonic dynamic that had produced our opponent. The United States wisely chose to leave issues of state-building and governance to the Mexicans themselves, while annexing the sparsely populated northern remnant of Spanish empire.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1552348

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