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How they joined? Militants and informers in the armed conflict in Donbas

Serhiy Kudelia

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2019, vol. 30, issue 2, 279-306

Abstract: The effectiveness of recruitment strategies is crucial for sustainability of any insurgent campaign. This paper identifies eight mechanisms used to encourage overt and covert participation in the armed conflict in Donbas and shows that they varied depending on the type of service expected from a recruit. It relies on the original dataset compiled from studying 798 court cases of insurgents and informers convicted in Ukrainian courts in the period from October 2014 to March 2017. The paper finds that militants were more responsive to contractual or hierarchical mechanisms of recruitment, while informers who provided cover support were more likely to join through ideological appeals or activation of prior social ties.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2018.1546361

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