Organized insurgency, lethality, and target selection: Abu Sayyaf Group and Jemaah Islamiyah

Nori Katagiri

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2019, vol. 30, issue 3, 518-542

Abstract: I examine the relationship between organizational stability, lethality, and target selection, and attack method of Southeast Asian insurgency. I do so by comparing the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), using data of their activities between 1994 and 2015. I make two arguments. First, organizationally unstable insurgency groups tend to see their members increase generate more casualties, while stable groups often experience reduction of violence. Second, organizational instability makes it more likely for groups to target civilian populations and business infrastructure than government, military and police forces, and transportation buildings. In contrast, organizational stability has limited explanatory power on its attack methods.

Date: 2019
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2019.1601838

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