The ‘strategy bridge’ as the forgotten dimension of effective COIN: the case of Peru and Sendero

Marina Miron

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2020, vol. 31, issue 1, 159-180

Abstract: This article examines the strategies employed – or not employed – in the Peruvian counterinsurgency campaign against the Sendero Luminoso insurgent group. Using Carl von Clausewitz’s and Colin Gray’s strategic theories as a lens through which to analyze the conflict, the aim here is to show what role strategy played in the eventual defeat of this insurgency and what obstacles the Peruvian state and its armed forces faced in enacting good strategy. Specifically, the utilization of the ‘strategy bridge’ concept is investigated. For a large part of this conflict, the strategy bridge linking the civil authorities with the military and its activities was missing. Once there emerged a clear understanding of the importance of ends, ways and means working in harmony could an effective counterinsurgency campaign flourish.

Date: 2020
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2020.1672971

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