Conditions for enduring peace: power-sharing and amnesty provisions

Jaeseok Cho

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2024, vol. 35, issue 6, 1079-1104

Abstract: Current scholarly literature posits that power-sharing agreements can be an important tool for reducing the chances of repeated civil wars. This study aims to find out what conditions influence the chances of successful power-sharing agreements. I test the effect of amnesty that is accompanied by power-sharing agreements when civil wars end with negotiated settlements. I analyse in particular 64 power-sharing agreements that ended civil wars between 1989 and 2006, using the event history model. The Weibull regression analysis indicates that power-sharing agreements are more likely to decrease the chances of repeated civil wars by relieving security concerns among former warring parties.

Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2024.2350799

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