Iran’s proxy war paradox: strategic gains, control issues, and operational constraints

Hüseyin Faruk Şimşek

Small Wars and Insurgencies, 2025, vol. 36, issue 6, 997-1024

Abstract: Proxy war strategy offers advantages along with inherent risks and limitations. This study analyzes the strategic benefits, challenges, and limitations of this approach. While proxies offer flexibility and plausible deniability, Iran faces challenges in controlling them, as seen in Hezbollah’s 2006 war and Hamas’s October 7 attack, which led to significant costs and strategic blowbacks. The inefficacy of Iran’s proxies in large scale operations in Syria and Iraq exposed their limits in conventional warfare. The challenges and limitations of the proxy war strategy underlined in this study raise questions about the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of the proxy war strategy.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2025.2512807

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