The October Crisis Revisited: Counterterrorism as Strategic Choice, Political Result, and Organizational Practice

H. D. Munroe

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2009, vol. 21, issue 2, 288-305

Abstract: Counterterrorism is generally understood in terrorism research as the product of rational strategic choice by governments. This is rarely the case, however: Strategic choice is often heavily circumscribed by the effects of crisis, when factors become significant drivers of government action. This paper uses the October Crisis of 1970 to demonstrate how the assumption of rational choice can be very misleading, and argues that scholarly research on counterterrorism needs a more nuanced understanding of how a governments' intent is translated into action.

Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.1080/09546550902765623

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