The counterterrorism agreements of Europol with third countries: Data protection and power asymmetry

Ethem Ilbiz, Christian Kaunert and Dimitrios Anagnostakis

Terrorism and Political Violence, 2017, vol. 29, issue 6, 967-984

Abstract: This article investigates empirically the impact of power asymmetry and interest formation in the European Union’s (EU) external relations with third countries in the context of the Europol data exchange and counterterrorism agreements. It focuses on three countries, namely the United States, Turkey, and Morocco, which each have a different level of counterterrorism cooperation with the EU. This article argues that the EU acts as a pragmatic actor with regard to Europol’s data exchange agreements with third countries, and that the power asymmetry between the EU and the third country under question determines the extent of the EU’s flexibility. If the power asymmetry favours the EU, then it insists on its data protection demands. Otherwise, the EU is more flexible towards its counterparts on data protection issues.

Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1080/09546553.2015.1092438

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